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Abstract: Researchers often need to elicit risk attitudes in field experiments or in laboratory 
experiments. However, choosing a risk elicitation task can be a source of concern, as risk 
attitudes have been often shown to vary dramatically across tasks. Using a large sample of 
approximately 2,000 subjects in a within-subjects design, we compare behavior in two 
commonly used incentivized risk elicitation tasks – the investment game and the ordered lottery 
choice game – recognized for their simplicity and ease of implementation. We find that risk 
attitudes elicited from the two tasks show considerable internal consistency, and importantly, 
have similar predictive validity for behavior in a different task with built-in uncertainty. We also 
explore determinants of inconsistency between the two risk tasks. 
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Researchers are frequently in need of simple tasks that can be adopted in lieu of more elaborate 
elicitation tasks (e.g., Angerer et al., 2015; Charness et al., 2018; Hermann and Musshoff, 2016; 
Zhang and Ortmann, 2016). There are various incentivized risk elicitation tasks that have been 
proposed and used in the literature (see Charness et al., 2012 and Holt and Laury, 2014 for recent 
reviews). However, choosing a task among them is not straightforward in light of previous 
experimental results that often document risk preferences varying dramatically across elicitation 
tasks, independent of the subject group being WEIRD or non-WEIRD (e.g., Andersen et al., 
2008; Berg et al., 2005; Dulleck et al. 2015; Harrison et al., 2005; He et al., 2017; Hey et al., 
2009; Isaac and James, 2000; Starmer and Sugden 1993).1 Further, there are trade-offs involved 
in choosing between elicitation tasks that present varying levels of difficulty for subjects. While 
complex tasks, requiring multiple decisions, and involving varying probabilities, may allow for a 
more precise classification of risk preferences, they may also induce noise due to poor 
comprehension by subjects (e.g., Charness et al., 2018; Crosetto and Filippin, 2016; Dave et al., 
2010).2 
For example, Crosetto and Filippin (2016) use a between-subjects design to compare 
behavior across four incentivized risk tasks: the multiple price list task of Holt and Laury (2002, 
HL hereafter), the ordered lottery choice game of Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008, EG 
hereafter), the investment game of Gneezy and Potters (1997, GP hereafter), and the bomb risk 
elicitation task of Crosetto and Filippin (2013).3 They find that estimated risk aversion varies 
greatly across the tasks, and suggest that task-specific features play an important role in 
explaining the observed differences. Since they use a between-subjects design, they are unable to 
comment on preference instability at the individual level. Dave et al. (2010) compare the HL and 
EG tasks, using a sample of Canadian residents, and suggest that the EG task is simpler in 
representation, easier to comprehend, and generates more stable preference estimates, especially 
among subjects with lower numeracy. Reynaud and Couture (2012) compare behavior of French 
farmers in the HL and EG tasks and find that subjects appear more risk averse in the EG task. 
                                                        
1 Henrich et al. (2010) coined the term WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic).  
2 Although the multiple price list task of Holt and Laury (2002) is deemed as the gold standard, inconsistent 
behavior is often observed in laboratory as well as in artefactual laboratory settings (e.g., Charness and Viceisza, 
2016; Cook et al., 2013). 
3 The ordered lottery choice task in the EG task is similar to the method proposed by Binswanger (1980, 1981). 
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Deck et al. (2013) consider whether domain-specific risk attitudes play a role in explaining the 
within- and between-subject inconsistency in risk preferences. Using four risk tasks (including 
versions of the EG and the HL tasks), they find that risk attitudes pertaining to gambling and 
financial domains explain only a small amount of variation in behavior across the risk tasks. 
This lack of internal consistency creates a problem, especially since risk elicitation tasks 
are often used to analyze behavior in other situations. In particular, risk preferences can have 
important consequences in very different domains which have in-built uncertainty, such as labor 
market, health, addictive behavior, migration, and self-employment (e.g., Dasgupta et al. 2015; 
Dawson and Henley, 2015; Dohmen et al., 2011; Hsieh et al., 2017).  
In this paper, we assess the internal and external validity of two frequently used 
incentivized risk tasks – the investment game (GP task) and the ordered lottery choice (EG task). 
Although the GP and EG tasks pose similar uncertainties in terms of probabilities, they have 
different representations, and there is little work carefully comparing behavior across these two 
tasks.4  We use risk attitudes elicited from these two tasks in a within-subjects design, and 
evaluate their internal validity, i.e., intrapersonal consistency of choices in the ordered lottery 
choice task and the investment game, controlling for individual-specific unobserved 
heterogeneity. Importantly, we examine external validity, i.e., whether the risk attitudes based on 
the two elicitation methods provide similar conclusions for predicting behavior under uncertainty 
in a third game, a competition game, that has in-built uncertainty. We also explore the role of 
personality traits (such as Big Five and locus of control) as well as socioeconomic characteristics 
in explaining the inconsistency in risk preferences elicited through the two tasks. 
Our results based on a large sample of approximately 2,000 university students in India 
indicate that risk attitudes elicited from the investment game predict well, albeit not perfectly, 
attitudes in the ordered lottery choice task. We also find that elicited risk attitudes from either of 
the tasks predict behavior in the competition task similarly, and there is no significant difference 
in their predictive validity. Finally, in examining the determinants of inconsistent behavior across 
the two risk tasks, we find that male subjects are more likely to be consistent in their risk 
preferences across our chosen tasks. In terms of personality traits, subjects that score higher on 
                                                        
4 In fact the investment task is being used increasingly in developing countries with non-WEIRD subjects (e.g., 
Gong and Yang, 2012; Cameron et al., 2013; Dasgupta et al., 2015; Gangadharan et al., 2016; Dasgupta et al., 
2017). 
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the Big Five emotional stability scale and internal locus of control scales demonstrate less 
inconsistency in risk attitudes, whereas subjects scoring higher on the Big Five agreeableness 
scale exhibit more inconsistency in risk attitudes. 
 
2. Experiment 
2.1 Choice of Elicitation Tasks 
We use a modified version of the original EG task (2002, 2008) similar to the one used in Dave 
et al. (2010). 5 Subjects are asked to choose one of six gambles presented in separate rows where 
each row represents a gamble with equal chances of receiving a high or a low payoff. Columns 1 
and 2 in Table 1 list the high and low payoffs for all rows. Gamble 1 is the safe alternative where 
the high and low payoffs are identical. In moving down from gamble 1 to gamble 5 there is a 
linear increase in expected returns as well as an increase in the standard deviation of the payoffs; 
between gambles 5 and 6, there is only an increase in standard deviation, but no increase in 
expected return. Under expected utility theory (EUT), risk-averse subjects should choose one of 
the lower-risk, lower-return gambles (i.e., gambles 1-4), whereas risk-neutral subjects should opt 
for gambles 5 or 6. Further, those opting for gamble 6 (in the presence of gamble 5) can 
plausibly be characterized as risk-loving.6 
In the investment or GP task, subjects are asked to divide an allocation of Rs. 150 
between a safe asset and a risky investment. If the risky investment is successful (50 percent 
chance of success), three times the invested amount is paid to the subject along with the amount 
set aside in the safe option. If the risky investment is unsuccessful, subjects only received the 
amount set aside in the safe option. Under EUT, a risk-neutral or a risk-loving person should 
invest the full amount in the GP task.    
[Table 1 here] 
 
Given our interest in using intuitive and easily comprehensible incentivized risk 
elicitation tasks, we purposefully chose the investment game and the ordered lottery choice task 
                                                        
5 The original ordered lottery choice task by Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008) consisted of five gambles.  
6 While the addition of this sixth gamble helps separate risk averse agents from risk seeking agents, it does not solve 
the problem observationally, since risk neutral subjects can still be indifferent between the fifth and the sixth 
gamble. 
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to minimize task dependent heterogeneity documented in previous work. The two tasks can be 
categorized under the ‘investment portfolio’ approach (Holt and Laury, 2014) and are similar in 
many ways.7 First, they are both framed as single decision tasks, in contrast to elicitation tasks 
that require subjects to make multiple decisions. Second, in both games the lottery probabilities 
are held constant at 0.5, which plausibly allows for better comprehension of the risk since 50 
percent may be easier to understand (compared to, for instance, 30 percent or 75 percent). Third, 
both tasks have the availability of a safe option, and are typically used to separate out degrees of 
risk aversion. Finally, recent surveys on the perceived complexity of tasks confirm that subjects 
find the GP and EG tasks to be similar in terms of their complexity (Crosetto and Filippin, 2016).  
  
2.2 Design and Protocol 
Our study design consisted of two parts: in the first part, subjects participated in four 
incentivized tasks, and in the second part, they completed a survey. Each subject participated in 
all tasks. The four incentivized tasks were a competition game, a distribution game, and the two 
risk tasks.8 Subjects were always presented with the EG task first, and the investment game next. 
Subjects did not receive feedback within-tasks, or between the tasks. To avoid wealth effects, 
only one of the tasks was randomly chosen for payments made at the end of a session. After the 
incentivized tasks, subjects completed a detailed survey that collected information on their 
family background, academic performance, performance on a Raven’s progression matrices test, 
and personality traits. We administered standard inventories for Big Five personality traits (this 
includes openness to experience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and emotional 
stability) and for locus of control.9   
                                                        
7 Table B2 and Figure B1 in Appendix B describe the “investment” interpretation inherent in the EG task. We are 
grateful to a reviewer for suggesting this interpretation. 
8 Instructions for the tasks are available in Appendix A. 
9  Openness to experience is the tendency to be open to new aesthetic, cultural or intellectual experiences. 
Conscientiousness refers to a tendency to be organized, responsible, and hard working. Extraversion relates to an 
outward orientation rather than being reserved. Agreeableness is related to the tendency to act in a cooperative and 
unselfish manner. Emotional stability is predictability and consistency in emotional reactions with absence of rapid 
mood changes. Locus of control ascertains the extent to which individuals believe they can control events affecting 
them. Those believing that life’s outcomes are due to their own efforts have a higher score on the locus of control 
(i.e., an internal locus of control), while those believing that outcomes are due to external factors (such as luck) have 
a lower score (i.e., an external locus of control).  
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The experiment was conducted among second and third year undergraduate students at 
the University of Delhi, India. We conducted 60 sessions with approximately 2,000 subjects, 
resulting in about 34 subjects per session.10 Each subject participated in only one session lasting 
for 75 minutes. All subjects received a show-up fee of Rs. 150. The average additional payment 
from the chosen task was Rs. 230.11  
Summary statistics reported in Table 2 indicate that approximately 50 percent of the 
sample is male, 57 percent belong to households that have high income (at least Rs. 50,000 per 
month), and 52 percent of the subjects have parents who have a graduate degree or more. 
Subjects are mostly Hindu (91 percent), and approximately 28 percent belong to disadvantaged 
groups of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (SC and STs) or Other Backward Classes 
(OBCs) respectively.12 
[Table 2 here] 
3. Results 
3.1 Aggregate Behavior in the Two Tasks 
In Column 4 in Table 1, we report the distribution of choices in our modified EG task. In our six-
row version of the ordered lottery choice task, 80.84 percent of subjects choose gambles 1-4, 
9.77 percent choose gamble 5, and the remaining 9.40 percent choose gamble 6. Dave et al. 
(2010) report that in their sample 77.9 percent choose gambles 1-4, 11.5 percent choose gamble 
5, and 10.7 percent choose gamble 6. In general, our subjects appear slightly more risk averse 
than their Canadian sample, plausibly due to differences in the subject samples and underlying 
cultural attitudes (India vs. Canada). Similar to our findings, Crosetto and Filippin (2016), using 
the original five-gamble version of the EG task find that 81.8 percent of their sample choose 
gambles 1-4. In Table 2, we see that the average subject in our sample chooses gamble 3 (low 
payoff = Rs. 60, high payoff = Rs. 132), which is close to the mean (2.79) selected gamble in the 
EG task for Crosetto and Filippin (2016) (note though this is not strictly comparable, as the 
                                                        
10 Crosetto and Filippin (2016) have approximately 85 subjects participate in the EG and GP tasks. 
11 The exchange rate at the time of running these experiments was USD 1 = Rs. 60. The current minimum wage per 
day for individuals with a high school degree, but not a college degree is Rs. 429, suggesting our risk experiments 
were sufficiently incentivized.  
12 While age is considered to be an important determinant of risk preferences, by design, there is not much variation 
in the data due to our exclusive subject sample of second and third year college students. 
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number of rows are different in the two cases and consequently the presented gamble choices are 
different in the two studies).   
In the GP task, 96.60 percent of the subjects invest less than the full endowment of Rs. 
150, and hence appear risk-averse (see Table 2). The average subject invests approx. Rs. 72 in 
the risky asset, amounting to 47.97 percent of their endowment. Based on the review of existing 
work, Charness and Viceisza (2016) find that student subjects invest between 44.67 percent and 
70.86 percent in the risky asset in the investment game. 
Overall, aggregate behavior in the two tasks suggests that a higher proportion of subjects 
appear to be more risk averse in the GP task compared to our EG task. This observed greater risk 
aversion in the GP task possibly stems from mental accounting and an aversion towards 
investing in an environment where there is an apparent chance of losing the invested amount, a 
conclusion also shared by Crosetto and Filippin (2016).  
Further, when we look at behavior separated by gender in the two tasks, females appear 
significantly more risk-averse than males. In the EG task, 86.48 percent of females and 75.23 
percent of males (Mann-Whitney, p-value < 0.001) exhibit risk aversion.13 The average row 
chosen by males is significantly higher than the one chosen by females (3.28 v. 2.80; Mann-
Whitney test, p-value < 0.001). Further, the distributions of gambles chosen by males and 
females are significantly different as seen in Figure 1A (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-value < 
0.001). In the GP task, 94.4 percent of males and 98.84 percent of females do not invest the 
entire endowment (Mann-Whitney test, p-value < 0.001). In terms of share invested in the risky 
asset, males invest 51.53 percent of their endowment compared to females who invest only 44.4 
percent (Mann-Whitney test, p-value < 0.001). Further, Figure 1B shows that distributions of 
shares invested are significantly different across genders (Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-value < 
0.001). The significant gender differences found in our experiments are consistent with previous 
literature (e.g., Charness and Gneezy, 2012; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Crosetto and Filippin 
2016).  
 
[Figures 1A and 1B here] 
 
                                                        
13 Unless noted otherwise, all statistical tests reported in the paper are based on two-tailed tests. 
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3.2 Internal Validity: Stability in Risk Attitudes 
In this section, we use risk attitudes elicited from the EG and GP tasks in a within-subjects 
design to evaluate their internal validity, i.e., intrapersonal consistency in the two tasks, 
controlling for individual-specific unobserved heterogeneity. We assume constant relative risk 
aversion (CRRA) utility function to derive the coefficient of relative risk aversion (r) for the 
investment task.14 We regress the risk aversion coefficients from the EG task on those derived 
from the investment game to determine stability in preferences across tasks.15 Since the lottery-
based EG task elicits ranges of risk aversion rather than point estimates (as seen in Column 3 of 
Table 1), we rely on interval regression methods, allowing for the dependent variable to have 
both upper and lower bounds, or be left or right-censored (Anderson and Mellor, 2009; Deck et 
al., 2013). A coefficient estimate of 1 on the risk aversion coefficient from the GP task would 
indicate perfect stability/association across two tasks. A coefficient between 0 and 1 would 
indicate that there is partial stability/association between the two tasks, and a coefficient of 0 
would suggest no association between the two tasks.  
Table 3 presents the regression results. We find that the risk preferences in both tasks are 
highly positively correlated, such that a 1-unit increase in the coefficient of relative risk aversion 
in the GP task increases the coefficient in the EG task by 0.80. Further, we find this marginal 
effect to be significantly different from 0, but not different from 1 (chi-squared test, p-value = 
0.146), indicating a strong association between elicited risk attitudes from the two tasks.  
 




                                                        
14 The derivation of the risk aversion coefficient for the two tasks using the CRRA utility function is provided in 
Appendix B. 
15 Although CRRA provides a highly stylized class of utility functions under expected utility theory (EUT), we 
adopt it since the large majority of the experimental literature on this topic uses the CRRA model when evaluating 
and comparing behavior under the EU framework. Consequently, for our purposes of providing a methodological 
insight, we want to have a similar framework that allows us to make comparisons between our findings and the 
existing literature. However, more broadly, EU is not the only framework that one can use in studying decision-
making under uncertainty, and plausibly, the findings in this paper could vary depending on the underlying model of 
decision-making under uncertainty. 
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3.3 External Validity: Predicting Behavior in the Competition Game 
We next examine external validity of the two risk elicitation tasks, i.e., if they predict behavior 
under uncertainty equally well in a third task that elicits willingness to compete. Competitive 
behavior explains important choices such as participation in labor market training programs, 
investment, educational outcomes, employment, and the evolution of gender differences in 
preferences (e.g., Buser et al., 2014; Dasgupta et al., 2015; Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007, 2011; 
Niederle, 2016) making the determinants of willingness to compete an important area of study. 
Since the competition game has an in-built element of risk, to understand the 
determinants of willingness to compete, one must naturally control for risk preferences. Existing 
studies looking at the determinants of willingness to compete therefore almost always control for 
risk preferences. For instance, Balafoutas et al. (2012) use the price list method based on 
Dohmen et al. (2010, 2011), and Bartling et al. (2009) use the Dohmen et al. (2010) method to 
elicit risk preferences. Overall, all these papers note that subjects who are more risk averse shy 
away from competition.  
Our interest here is in examining the impact of risk preference using the EG and GP tasks 
on selecting into the tournament wage scheme. In Table 4, we examine whether the risk aversion 
coefficients obtained from the two tasks allow us to arrive at similar conclusions when predicting 
behavior in this third task, the competition game, which is characterized by uncertainty.  
In the competition game, subjects are asked to perform an effort-based task (quiz on 
adding four two-digit numbers), and to choose between a piece-rate payment scheme where 
payment depends on their own performance, and a tournament wage scheme where payment 
depends on their own performance relative to that of a randomly selected student who had 
performed the task earlier. Choosing the tournament scheme, as opposed to the piece-rate 
payment scheme, involves an element of risk since the payoff in this case depends on relative 
performance, and could be zero if the subject’s performance falls below that of a randomly 
matched student. Subjects with greater degrees of risk aversion would then prefer the fixed 
payment scheme to the tournament wage scheme. Consequently, based on the findings from 
previous literature, we expect the risk aversion coefficients to be negatively related to 




[Table 4 here] 
 
We estimate OLS regressions where we regress the choice of payment scheme (takes a value 1 if 
subject chooses the tournament scheme, 0 if piece-rate scheme) on standardized measures of the 
risk aversion coefficients, obtained from the EG task and the GP task, to make them more readily 
comparable across regressions (see Columns 1 and 2, Table 4). 
In Columns 3 and 4 we also control for a rich set of socioeconomic and demographic 
characteristics collected in the survey, such as gender, caste, religion, family income, and 
parental education (see Panel B, Table 2). We include ability, proxied by subjects’ performance 
on a simple two-digit number addition task in the practice round of the competition game, and 
performance on the Raven’s progression matrices test which measures the ability to solve novel 
problems. We also control for subject’s confidence as a dummy that takes a value 1 if the subject 
believes ex-ante that her performance in the actual task will exceed those of others in the 
university, 0 otherwise.  
Our specifications also include personality traits (such as Big Five and locus of control) 
as determinants of competitive choices. Our empirical specification is motivated by recent work 
that shows that personality traits and other socioeconomic characteristics influence competitive 
behavior (e.g., Bartling et al., 2009; Dasgupta et al., 2019; Gill and Prowse, 2016). 
In Column 1 of Table 4, we find that a one standard deviation increase in the risk 
aversion coefficient from the EG task is associated with a 7 percent decrease in the probability of 
choosing the tournament wage scheme. We arrive at a similar conclusion by examining the 
relationship between competition and the standardized risk aversion coefficient from the GP task 
reported in Column 2, Table 4, though the effect size is now marginally smaller. These results 
are robust to the inclusion of the full set of controls in Columns 3 and 4. We further find that 
there is no significant difference in the risk aversion coefficients between Columns 3 and 4 (z-
statistic, p-value = 0.16), indicating that risk aversion, as assessed from both these tasks, 
performs equally well in predicting competitive behavior.16 Lastly, the R-squared obtained from 
these regressions indicated in the bottom panel of Table 4 show that the risk aversion coefficients 
from the EG task reported in Columns 1 and 3 do only slightly better than the risk aversion 
                                                        
16 These results are robust to using a probit model.  
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coefficients from the GP task reported in Columns 2 and 4 in explaining the variation in 
willingness to compete.  
Our results are in contrast to Lönnqvist et al. (2015), who used risk attitudes from the HL 
task and the non-incentivized questionnaire of Dohmen et al. (2011) to predict behavior in a trust 
game, and found significant differences in the ability of these risk measures to predict trusting 
behavior. Coppola (2014), however, uses similar multi-item questions on willingness to take risk 
as well as their own designed lottery tasks to find that measured risk attitudes have reasonable 
predictive validity for a multitude of life attitude questions related to health, career, sports, etc.  
 
3.4 Sources of Inconsistency  
We next examine inconsistency in risk attitudes using the absolute value of the difference in risk 
aversion coefficients from the EG task and the GP task.17 For the ordered lottery choice task (EG 
task), we use the midpoints of the intervals as in Deck et al. (2008) and Deck et al. (2013). 
Higher absolute difference in risk aversion coefficients denote greater inconsistency.  
We find that males are significantly less inconsistent than females (Mann-Whitney test, 
p-value < 0.001). In Figure 2, we further present the distribution of the inconsistency variable 
separately for males and females. We reject the null that the two distributions are identical 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, p-value < 0.001).  
To explore the sources of inconsistency, we regress this measure of inconsistency on 
gender, family background characteristics, and cognitive ability, the set of controls commonly 
used to explain variation in risk preferences (Dohmen et al., 2010, 2011; Dasgupta et al., 2017). 
We also control for personality traits as evidence from psychology suggests that variation in risk 
attitudes (and consequently, inconsistencies in revealed risk attitudes) can be attributed to 
differences in personality traits (Deck et al., 2008; Weber and Johnson, 2008; Fréchette et al., 
2017; Rustichini et al., 2016).  
OLS results reported in Table 5 show that males appear to be relatively less inconsistent 
across risk elicitation tasks. We find that subjects scoring higher on the Big Five emotional 
stability scale and the locus of control scale are less likely to exhibit inconsistency in risk 
                                                        
17 We use absolute values of the raw difference in the risk aversion coefficients so that we can treat both positive and 
negative deviations similarly. Note that the raw difference in risk aversion coefficient has no greater predictive 
power over the absolute difference in the risk aversion coefficients.  
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preferences across tasks. We also note that subjects scoring higher on the Big Five agreeableness 
scale exhibit more inconsistency in risk preferences across tasks. Parental education, family 
income, caste, and religion have no power in explaining the variation in inconsistency between 
the two tasks in our sample.18 
[Table 5 here] 
 
 4. Discussion and Conclusion 
Experimental evaluations of welfare policies have taken off in a big way in developing countries, 
and new evidence suggests that being aware of recipients’ risk attitudes is critical for successful 
policy implementation (Harrison, 2011; Dasgupta et al., 2015). However, choosing a simple task 
to elicit risk attitudes is particularly challenging in light of evidence from previous studies that 
shows elicited risk preferences to be highly sensitive to the method used.  
We select two of the simpler and yet commonly used risk elicitation tasks that share 
similarities in representation, do not vary in probabilities, and are found to be easier to 
comprehend in the previous literature (Dave et al., 2010; Crosetto and Filippin, 2016) to provide 
evidence on their internal and external validity. Using data on approximately 2,000 student 
subjects, we find that the ordered lottery choice task and the investment task show considerable 
levels of internal consistency. We also find that elicited risk attitudes from the two tasks have 
similar predictive validity vis-à-vis a third task that has in-built uncertainty, establishing external 
validity. Further, our results indicate that the consistency across our two chosen tasks depends on 
gender and some personality traits while other socioeconomic characteristics have no 
explanatory power.   
Since our risk elicitation tasks were chosen to be structurally similar on multiple 
characteristics as explained earlier, our results suggest that some of the inconsistencies in elicited 
risk attitudes in the literature can indeed stem from different representations of the tasks, leading 
to heterogeneity in risk perceptions emanating from those tasks as suggested by Crosetto and 
Filippin (2016) and Charness et al. (2018). Our results suggest that for fixed and commonly 
                                                        
18 These results are robust to using an alternative definition for inconsistency where we inconsistency takes a value 1 
if the risk aversion coefficient in the GP task does not fall in the range of coefficients for the chosen row in the EG 
task, 0 otherwise. Table B3 of Appendix B shows that results using this alternative definition are similar to those in 
Table 5, except that they are somewhat weaker in statistical significance . 
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understood probabilities and similar elicitation methods, subjects do in fact display more 
consistent risk attitudes. Consequently, given our relatively large subject pool, we feel confident 
that using either of the two tasks to elicit risk attitudes would provide comparable results. 
Consequently, a researcher can pick either of these two simple methods to elicit behavior under 
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Note: The inconsistency measures the absolute value of the difference in risk aversion coefficients elicited 
from the EG task and the GP task 
 


































Gamble 1 84 84 3.46 < r 19.74 17.48 22.01 
Gamble 2 72 108 1.16 < r < 3.46 22.35 18.73 26.00 
Gamble 3 60 132 0.71 < r < 1.16 20.68 20.29 21.07 
Gamble 4 48 156 0.5 < r < 0.71 18.07 18.73 17.40 
Gamble 5 36 180 0 < r < 0.5 9.77 11.55 7.97 
Gamble 6 6 210 r < 0 9.40 13.22 5.56 
Observations    1,915 961 954 






















  Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 Mean 
 (std. dev) 
Panel A: Risk measures  
 




GP task: amount invested in Rs. [0, 150] 71.97 
 (26.38) 
EG task: risk aversion coefficient 1.60 
 (1.40) 
GP task: risk aversion coefficient 0.59 
 (0.34) 
EG task: % risk averse 80.83 
 (39.36) 
GP task: % risk averse 96.60 
 (18.11) 








Family income  0.57 
 (0.49) 




Scheduled Caste/Tribe 0.13 
 (0.33) 
Other Backward Classes 0.15 
 (0.36) 
Raven’s test score 6.50 
 (2.27) 










Emotional stability 4.55 
 (1.33) 
Openness to experience 5.34 
 (1.14) 




Notes: The average of the risk coefficient in the EG task is computed over its 6 
rows/intervals. The maximum possible scores for the Big Five traits and locus of 


















Table 3: Stability of Risk Attitudes 
 
 (1)  
 Relative risk 
aversion range in the 
EG task 
 
   
Risk aversion coefficient in the GP task 0.80***  
 (0.13)  
Constant 1.06***  
 (0.09)  
   






Log pseudolikelihood -3575.38  
Observations 1,915  
Notes: This table reports coefficient estimates from an interval regression. Standard 




























Table 4: External Validity of Risk Measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Compete Compete Compete Compete 
     
Risk aversion coefficient: EG task -0.070***  -0.056***  
 (0.011)  (0.012)  
Risk aversion coefficient: GP task  -0.046***  -0.036*** 
  (0.008)  (0.009) 
Male   0.143*** 0.148*** 
   (0.024) (0.026) 
Ability   0.007 0.006 
   (0.013) (0.013) 
Confidence   0.089*** 0.095*** 
   (0.022) (0.022) 
Family income   0.023 0.024 
   (0.025) (0.025) 
Parents’ education   -0.001 -0.002 
   (0.023) (0.023) 
Raven's test score   0.001 -0.001 
   (0.005) (0.005) 
Extraversion   0.005 0.004 
   (0.010) (0.010) 
Agreeableness   -0.001 -0.004 
   (0.010) (0.009) 
Conscientiousness   -0.003 -0.005 
   (0.013) (0.013) 
Emotional stability   0.012 0.015 
   (0.012) (0.012) 
Openness to experience   0.021** 0.020** 
   (0.008) (0.009) 
Locus of control   0.026** 0.029** 
   (0.012) (0.012) 
Constant 0.311*** 0.311*** 0.239*** 0.253*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.061) (0.058) 
Observations 1,915 1,915 1,915 1,915 
R-squared 0.023 0.010 0.067 0.059 
Notes: This table reports marginal effects from OLS regressions. Religion and caste dummies also included in 
this regression. Personality traits are standardized and z-score constructs of these variables used in the 









Table 5: Determinants of Inconsistent Behavior 
 
 (1) 
 Absolute difference 






Family income -0.036 
 (0.071) 
Parents’ education -0.046 
 (0.068) 
Raven's test score 0.082 
 (0.054) 








Emotional stability -0.045* 
 (0.025) 
Openness to experience 0.024 
 (0.026) 






Notes: This table reports marginal effects from an OLS regression. The dependent variable is the 
absolute value of the difference in risk aversion coefficients between the EG and GP tasks. Religion 
and caste dummies also included in this regression. Personality traits are standardized and z-score 
constructs of these variables used in the regression. Standard errors clustered at session level in 
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Appendix A: Experiment Instructions 
 
Subject instructions for the Eckel and Grossman Risk Task: 
 
In this task, you will choose one row out of six different rows that are listed on the next 
page. 
 
Each row consists of a lottery that has two possible outcomes (LOW or HIGH). For every 
row, HIGH and LOW has an equal chance (50%) of occurring. For example, if you select 
row 4 and HIGH occurs, you will be paid Rs. 156. If LOW occurs, you will be paid Rs. 
48. 
 
Your payment for this task will be determined by: 
 
• Which one of the six rows you select; and  
• Which of the two possible outcomes (HIGH or LOW) occur.  
 
If this task is selected for payments, we will roll a six-sided die to determine which 
outcome will occur. If the die shows 1, 2, or 3 you get the LOW payment from your 




















Refer to the 6 rows at the bottom of this page to answer the following questions before 
you start:  
 
1. ✓ the row that you think most other students in this room will select?  
☐ Row 1       ☐ Row 2      ☐ Row 3      
☐ Row 4       ☐ Row 5      ☐ Row 6 
 
2. If you are selected to receive payments from this task do you think a HIGH outcome 





Instructions for completing the task 
 
• You must select one and only one of these six Rows. If you choose more than one 
Row, your decision will be disqualified if this task is chosen for payment and you will 
not be paid anything.  
• Mark your selected Row with a ✓ in the last box. REMEMBER you choose only 
ONE of the six rows.  
 Outcome Payoff Chances 
Mark only one 
Row with ✓  
      
Row 1 LOW Rs. 84 50%   
 HIGH Rs. 84 50%   
      
Row 2 LOW Rs. 72 50%   
 HIGH Rs. 108 50%   
      
Row 3 LOW Rs. 60 50%   
 HIGH Rs. 132 50%   
      
Row 4 LOW Rs. 48 50%   
 HIGH Rs. 156 50%   
     
 
 
Row 5 LOW Rs. 36 50%   
 HIGH Rs. 180 50%   
      
Row 6 LOW Rs. 6 50%   
 HIGH Rs. 210 50%   
  
 28 
Subject instructions for the Gneezy and Potters Risk Task: 
 
You are given Rs. 150. You have to decide how much of it to keep aside safely, and how 
much of it to invest in a lottery. There is 50% chance that you win the lottery and 50% 
chance that you lose. If you win the lottery, you will get 3 times the amount you invest in 
the lottery; if you lose you will lose the amount you put in the lottery.  
 
Example: Suppose, out of Rs.150 you decide to invest Rs. 100 in the lottery and set aside 
Rs. 50 safely. If you win the lottery then you will get 3*100 =Rs. 300 from the lottery 
PLUS Rs. 50 that you had set aside safely. If you lose the lottery then you will get Rs. 0 
from the lottery PLUS Rs. 50 that you had set aside safely.  
 
If this task is selected for payments, we will roll a six-sided die to determine if you win or 
lose the lottery. If the die shows 1, 2, or 3, you win the lottery. If it shows 4, 5 or 6, you 
lose the lottery. 
 
Write your decisions below: 
 






Keep safely __________________________ 
 
 





Subject instructions for the competition task: 
 
The task is to calculate the sum of four numbers for as many rows as you can in 90 
seconds. We will first have a 30 seconds practice round. After that you will get 
approximately 2 minutes to answer 4 questions asked on the next page. Once 
everyone has filled his or her responses to the 4 questions, the researcher will 
announce the start of the actual task for which you will have 90 seconds to complete 
the task.  
 
You can practice using the following three problems below. The researcher will 




Calculate the sum of the four numbers for each of the three rows below. Write your 
answer in the box with “Total” written in it.  
 




28  17  42  Total = 
 
 




45 98 77 Total = 
 
 




99 56 34 Total = 
 
 
Once you have completed your answers above, please wait till the researcher 









In the next 2 minutes, please answer the questions on this page. Do not move to 
the next page until the researcher announces “START”. 
 




2. As compared to other students in this room, do you think you will be able to 





3. As compared to any other student from Delhi University, do you think you will be 





4. For this task, there are two payment schemes. Please select one of them. In case 
this task is chosen for payments, you will be paid according to your chosen scheme. 
Place a ✓ for one of the payment options below: 
 
 Option 1: you play alone and get Rs. 10 for every correctly solved row.  
 
 Option 2: you play against another student from Delhi University (40 students 
like you have already played this game, and we noted the total number of rows each 
of them solved correctly in 90 seconds). If this task is chosen for payment, your 
performance will be matched with the performance of one of the 40 students in the 
following way: you will be asked to pick a chit. Each chit contains the number of 
correctly solved rows for one of the 40 Delhi University students. So, there are 40 
chits in all. If you correctly solve the same or more rows than the matched student’s 
performance (the number in the chit), you will get Rs. 20 for every correctly solved 
answer. If you solve less number of problems than the matched student’s performance 
then you will get Rs. 0.  
 
Wait till the researcher says “START” to start the task. Stop this task as soon 
as the researcher announces “STOP”. You will be disqualified from participating 








Calculate the sum of the four numbers for as many rows as you can in 90 seconds. Write 













































































































1. Derivation of the CRRA coefficient from allocation in the GP task 
The CRRA coefficients are derived from the investment game in the following way. 
Assume that individual 𝑖  divides her budget 𝐵  between the risky and the safe asset. 
Assume that 𝐿𝑖 is the amount invested in the risky asset. Then the amount invested in the 
safe asset 𝑆𝑖 = 𝐵 − 𝐿𝑖. Assume that 𝐼𝑖 is the permanent income of the individual, which 
can be assumed to be zero without loss of generality. Individual 𝑖 then maximizes her 
expected utility, and chooses 𝐿𝑖.  
 
 𝑀𝑎𝑥: 𝐸(𝑈𝑖(𝐿𝑖, 𝑆𝑖|𝐵)) = 0.5𝑈𝑖(𝑆𝑖) + 0.5𝑈𝑖(𝑆𝑖 + 3𝐿𝑖)
= 0.5𝑈𝑖(𝐵 − 𝐿𝑖) + 0.5𝑈𝑖(𝐵 + 2𝐿𝑖)
 
(1) 
The first order condition for this maximization problem is: 
 −0.5𝑈𝑖
′(𝐵 − 𝐿𝑖) + 1.5𝑈𝑖
′(𝐵 + 2𝐿𝑖) = 0
𝑈𝑖




Assuming a CRRA utility function, equation (2) implies 
 (𝐵 − 𝐿𝑖)
−𝜌 = 2(𝐵 + 2𝐿𝑖)
−𝜌  












So, the optimal investment in the risky asset (𝐿𝑖
∗) is a function of the coefficient of 
relative risk aversion (𝜌) and the endowment (𝐵). Given 𝐿𝑖












Given 𝐵 and the optimal investment in the risky asset one can obtain the coefficient of 




2. Derivation of the CRRA parameters for the Ordered Lottery Choice task (EG 
task) 
 
We use a modified version of the EG task which adds the sixth gamble as in Dave et al. 
(2010). The CRRA bounds are found in the task by comparing each gamble (row) to its 
neighbors and calculating the value of r that generates the same utility level for the 
payoffs associated with each adjacent gamble. For example, the lower bound of gamble 3 
is found by comparing the utility level associated with gamble 4 and gamble 3 (see Table 
B1 below). Similarly, the upper bound of gamble 3 is found by comparing the utility 
level associated with gamble 2 with gamble 3. Further a utility function of the form of 
U(Y) = Y1-r/1-r to represent CRRA is assumed. For our prizes in the modified EG task we 
increased each original prize from Dave et al. (2010) by a factor of 3. Since we assume 
CRRA, the risk attitudes of individuals are not affected by a multiplicative transformation 
of a lottery with a given expected value, by definition of the properties of a CRRA 
function. This ensures that when we compare the utility levels for each gamble to back 
out the risk coefficients, we face the original parameters/gamble sizes as in the modified 
EG task used in Dave et al. (2010). We reproduce them along with our modified payoffs 
below in Table B1 below. Now, for verification purposes, consider deriving the upper 
bound for gamble 2 with the prizes used in our experiment. As explained above to get to 
the upper bound of gamble 2, we compare gamble 1 and gamble 2. Hence, we have, 
    
Expected utility from gamble 1 = expected utility from gamble 2 
 

































                                              (1) 
 
Equation (1) is exactly the same comparison we need to calculate r using the Dave et al. 
(2010) gamble sizes (see Table B1 below) for their gamble 1 and gamble 2. Similar 
calculations hold for the other rows. Therefore, the CRRA ranges calculated for our paper 






Table B1: Comparison of prizes  
 
 Size of prizes in our 
experiment 
 Size of prizes in the 
























Gamble 1 84 84 3.46 < r 28 28 
Gamble 2 72 108 1.16<r<3.46 24 36 
Gamble 3 60 132 0.71<r<1.16 20 44 
Gamble 4 48 156 0.5<r<0.71 16 52 
Gamble 5 36 180 0<r<0.5 12 60 























Gamble 1 84 84 84 3.46 < r 
Gamble 2 72 or 108 72 72 + 0.5 chance of 3 x 12  1.16 < r < 3.46 
Gamble 3 60 or 132 60 60 + 0.5 chance of 3 x 24 0.71 < r < 1.16 
Gamble 4 48 or 156 48 48 + 0.5 chance of 3 x 36 0.5 <  r < 0.71 
Gamble 5 36 or 180 36 36 + 0.5 chance of 3 x 48 0 < r < 0.5 
Gamble 6 6 or 210 6 6 + 0.5 chance of 3 x 68 r < 0 





Figure B1: Proportion invested in the lottery in both EG and GP tasks* 
 
*Note: Although the framing of the two tasks appear different, it is possible to construct measures of 
amount invested in a lottery using the responses from the EG task. For example: A choice of gamble 1 in 
the EG task can be reinterpreted as investing 0% of your endowment, while a choice of gamble 2 is 
investing 12/84 = about 14% of the endowment.19 
 
 
                                                        




Table B3: Determinants of Inconsistent Behavior 
 
 (1) 





Family income -0.006 
 (0.021) 
Parents’ education 0.002 
 (0.025) 
Raven's test score 0.033 
 (0.022) 








Emotional stability -0.015* 
 (0.009) 
Openness to experience 0.001 
 (0.011) 






Notes: This table reports marginal effects from an OLS regression. The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value 1 if the risk 
aversion coefficient in the GP task does not fall in the range of 
coefficients for the chosen row in the EG task, 0 otherwise. Religion and 
caste dummies also included in this regression. Personality traits are 
standardized and z-score constructs of these variables used in the 
regression. Standard errors clustered at session level in parentheses. *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
